Techdude delivers a final report that exceeds my wildest expectations. It is irrefutable, empirical evidence - Obama's birth
certificate is a forgery.
Why? Why a COLB (certificate of live birth) forgery? That is the question.
My deepest thanks and appreciation for Techdude's unwavering
commitment to the truth despite the threats and harassment, the slashed
tires and the dead animal on his porch.
Insofar as "techdude's" credentials, he is an active member of the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners,
American College of
Forensic Examiners, The International Society of Forensic Computer
Examiners, International Information Systems Forensics Association - the
list goes on. He also a
board certified as a forensic computer examiner, a certificated legal investigator, and a
licensed private investigator.
He has been performing computer based forensic investigations since
1993 (although back then it did not even have a formal name yet) and he
has performed countless investigations since then.
Here is his analysis:
Obama’s Birth
Certificate – CHANGE you can believe in.
I have decided to leave out the low level technicalities and
the how-to section of this report due to a lack of time and more importantly I
want to get the facts out as quickly as possible. As some of you may or may not
know some asshat decided to track me down and vandalize my car and hang a dead mutilated
rabbit from my front door in a lame attempt to intimidate me from proceeding
with releasing any details of my analysis. They did succeed in delaying the
report by a few days but instead of deterring me they just really pissed me
off. To their credit, if I had not taken a few days off from the analysis I
would have missed the most damning piece of evidence – the remnants of the
previous security border. So to the demented retard who slaughtered an animal
to make a point – f*ck you and thank you. And because of the amazing number of violent
psychopaths who seem to be drawn to this issue, I am not going to use or supply
any details that can be used to identify the owners of the COLBS used in the
analysis except for those which have already been publicly disclosed. If the
owners want to come forward on their own that is entirely their decision. Now
let’s get to the summarized report.
In questioned document analysis there are several methods
for detecting forgeries – the most basic of which is to conduct a side by side
evaluation of known good samples to compare against the questioned one and to
use an alternate light source to highlight the changes in the color and density
of the inks and paper. In the case at hand there are no questioned physical
documents to examine so I used the same basic techniques modified for the
digital age for use in computer forensic analysis.
The following analysis was conducted using various Hawaiian COLBS
issued over a multi-year time frame ranging from 2001 through 2008 but this
report will focus only on the results from the March 2007 through June 2008
certificates for accurately comparing against the KOS image purportedly printed
by the Health Department of Hawaii in June 2007. I am only interested in
comparing apples to apples as they say but I will touch on some of the other
years for a brief comparative and observational analysis.
Since the image presented
is a graphical image and not a physical certificate I made the concerted effort
to track down known good certificates and certificates images to use for the
analysis. Thanks to several individuals I managed to collect and review
multiple images of certificates issued between 2001 through 2003 all of which bore
an identical layout to the previous Decosta image which was issued during the
same time frame. Several more certificate images and physical certificates were
also sent to me of certificates issued between 2006 through 2008 directly by
their respective owners. All of the 2006
through 2008 certificates bore an identical layout to one another. Several
copies of the images were created to allow digital modifications to be made
without altering the original images. MD5 and SHA1 signatures were generated
for each of the images and their duplicates. The signatures of the duplicates
matched against their originals and the original images were then moved to a
separate protected directory on the server.
By separating the certificate issue dates into groups the
pre-2006 certificates show a clearly different security border design than the
more recent 2006 through 2008 design. There
were no other visually detectible modifications to the layout of the
certificates between all time frames aside from the additional change from the
DATE ACCPETED to DATE FILED headings.
Image 1. 2001 – 2008 border patterns
All known good certificate images from all time frames examined
shared an apparent identical layout and font. Each of the available un-cropped
full certificate images, from all time frames, showed the security borders to
be almost perfectly centered from left to right within the lower 2/3 rd portion
of the 8 ½ x 11 inch page with all deviations off center being within 15
pixels. Measurements were taken from the top left, top right, bottom left,
bottom right, center top, and center bottom of each images security border to
the edges of the visible paper which appeared as hard edges with the top cover
of the scanners creating whitespace.
Image 2. Measurements
The embossed seals and ink stamps in all of the pre-2006
images are clearly visible in the scans however none of the post-2006 seals or
ink stamps are visible without extensive manipulation to the digital images.
Even when scanning the physical post-2006 certificate in my possession using
multiple resolutions and using multiple scanners I was also unable to produce
an image which would allow the seal to show though the image. The ink stamps on
the rear side were also not visible in the front side scans without digital modifications
to the scanned images. My scans of the physical certificate also produced the
same results using multiple resolutions and using multiple scanners.
The post-2006 COLBs were then compared against one another
for a direct 1:1 comparison. Using copies of the images I digitally enhanced and
modified the scans by removing only the hatch pattern background and then removing
the merged information fields leaving just the raw document templates and saving
them as a series of digital overlay templates. When the 2006 overlay was placed
on top of the 2007 image they matched from corner to corner with some minor
variations on the minute angle of the images. The fonts were observed to be in
the same locations and of the same size and kerning. The procedure was then
used with the 2006 overlay on top of the 2008 image. Once again, they matched
from corner to corner with some minor variations on the minute angle of the
images. The fonts were observed to be in the same locations and of the same size,
style, and kerning. The 2007 overlay was then applied on top of the 2008 image.
The 2007 and 2008 also matched from corner to corner with some minor variations
on the minute angle of the images. The fonts were observed to be in the same
locations and of the same size, style, and kerning. Having verified that all of
the examined post-2006 certificates were identical in form and substance I then
focused the rest of the analysis using the 2007 and 2008
COLB
KOS
image to pin the document into the middle of the known time frame.
Image 3. Overlays
The same measurement methodology was used against the full
un-cropped KOS image and showed the security borders to be uncentered from left
to right within the lower 2/3 rd portion of the 8 ½ x 11 inch page with a
deviation from the other measurements off center being the average of 75 pixels – a 60 pixel greater deviation.
Measurements were taken from the top left, top right, bottom left, bottom right,
center top, and center bottom of each images security border to the edges of
the visible paper which appeared as hard edges with the top cover of the
scanners creating whitespace. The differences are also detectible visually
without the use of digital enhancements.
Image 4. measurement comparisons
The previously created overlays were placed on top of the image. When the 2007 overlay was placed on top of the
image they did not immediately line up.
After being matched from security border corner to security border corner with
some minor variations on the minute angle of the images the security border
pattern obviously did not match in pattern or in color. The fonts were observed
to not be in the same locations and they also did not share same kerning. The
procedure was then used with the 2008 overlay on top of the KOS
image. Once again when the 2008 overlay was placed on top of the image they did not immediately line up. After being
matched from corner to corner like the 2007 overlay again with some minor
variations on the minute angle of the images the security border pattern
obviously did not match in pattern or in color. The fonts were observed to not
be in the same locations on the page and they also did not share same kerning.
Image 5. with 2007 and 2008
overlays
A direct relative comparison using unmodified copies of the
original images were made in regards to the security border pattern and color.
Several distinctions were noted from the 2007 / 2008 certificate security
border versus the security border used in the KOS image.
Image 6. Border comparisons
Direct relative measurements using unmodified copies of the
original images were made in regards to the font size and kerning. Several
letters were distinctly different in width and kerning from the 2007 / 2008
certificate font versus the font used in the
KOS image such as O, H, N, R, and C.
Images 7 – 9. Animated GIFs showing kerning differences
The metadata and EXIF information was then extracted from
the 2007, 2008, and the two images. The
metadata extracted from the JPG files consisted of the quantization tables used
for compressing the image and the EXIF data if it was present.
The 2007 image’s rate of compression was calculated to an
approximated 75% quality factor at 300 dpi with an image size of 2550 x 3300
pixels in a portrait orientation and contained no EXIF data.
The 2008 image’s rate of compression was calculated to an
approximated 80% quality factor at 300 dpi with an image size of 2550 x 3300
pixels in a portrait orientation and also contained no EXIF data.
The un-cropped image’s
rate of compression was calculated to an approximated 90% quality factor at 300
dpi with an image size of 2550 x 3300 pixels in a portrait orientation and also
contained the following relevant EXIF data:
[Software ] = Adobe
Photoshop CS3 Macintosh
[DateTime ] = 2008:
06:12
08:42:36
[ColorSpace ] = 65535
[ExifImageWidth ] = 2550
[ExifImageHeight] = 3300
Raw Image Orientation = Portrait
Photoshop Save As Quality = [8]
Photoshop Save Format = [Progressive]
The cropped image’s
rate of compression was calculated to an approximated 50% quality factor at 300
dpi with an image size of 2427 x 2369 pixels in a landscape orientation and
also contained the following relevant EXIF data:
[Software ] = Adobe
Photoshop CS3 Macintosh
[DateTime ] = 2008:
06:12
08:42:36
[ColorSpace ] = 65535
[ExifImageWidth ] = 2427
[ExifImageHeight] = 2369
Raw Image Orientation = Landscape
The 2007, 2008, and the two
KOS
images were then analyzed by creating a heat map showing where each pixel
changes as jpeg quality decreases from 100 to 0. A change was considered
relevant once the sum of the changes to the red, green, and blue values exceeded
10%. The heat map created from the 2007 and 2008 images showed the fonts, seal
image, and security border are all identical consistent values. To eliminate
any subjective presumptions and to increase the number of comparative tests the
same analysis was then conducted on the 2006 and prior certificate images which
all found the fonts, seal images, and security borders to also be saved with
identical consistent values. The same analysis on the KOS
images showed the security border having a substantially different RGB quality value than the fonts and the seal
image.
Image 10. RGB value heat maps
Image 11. Detailed images of RGB
value heat maps
The 2007, 2008, and the two KOS images were also analyzed for jpeg
compression variations by creating a heat
map showing where the difference for a particular compression level is
indicated. A change was considered relevant once the sum of the changes
to the
error level values exceeded 10% of the previously calculated compression
error
rates. The heat map created from the 2007 and 2008 images showed the
fonts,
seal image, and security border are all identical consistent values. To
eliminate any subjective presumptions and to increase the number of
comparative
tests the same analysis was then conducted on the 2006 and prior
certificate
images which all found the fonts, seal images, and security borders to
also be compressed
with identical consistent values. The same analysis on the KOS image
indicated that the security border has a different error value than the
fonts and the seal image.
Image 12. Error level analysis heat maps
Image 13. Detailed images of error level analysis heat map
The image contains numerous visible artifacts located at
various points throughout the image. These artifacts are not found on any other
known good image from any examined time frame. I began creating a pixel level
map of these errors by using a copy of the full un-cropped version and simply
highlighting the areas by drawing a pixel wide line to the left and to the
right of each visible flaw. The left side of the image towards the inside edge
of the security border contained stray vertical lines that did not match up to
any of the jpeg compression artifacts so they were highlighted. The right side
of the image contained visual pixel level inconsistencies in the background
hatch pattern. The right side pattern is visually consistent with the artifacts
left after digitally erasing an area from an image and attempting to rebuild
the background.
Image 14. Some random flaws
highlighted
By connecting the
points together the original placement of what appears to be part of the
original security border becomes apparent. The placement of the lines matches
the expected location of a good security border based on the known placement
from the known good certificates. The width and spacing of the highlighted
areas also match a 1:1 scale overlay from a section of a known good security
border.
Image 15. Connected lines
A close examination
of the security border itself reveals
several repeating inconsistencies. Among them is a “weak line” which repeats once
after every second bold line and a slightly downward curving end point where a
straight line should end. This pattern continues around the entire perimeter of
the security border. Upon very close
inspection portions of the security border also repeat every 240 pixels. By
mapping this repeating pattern it becomes apparent that the pattern is laid out
as a 240 x 240 pixel square that can be accurately extrapolated to the next
position by simply counting 240 pixels. This type of tiling effect is commonly
seen when an image has been modified by filling an area using an image editing
application’s tile or pattern fill function.
Image 16. Mapped border pattern
During the course of
my analysis several calls were made to various departments in the Hawaiian
State Government in an attempt to better understand the process and procedures
used to create, print, and distribute copies of the COLB form. While I was
brushed off or hung up upon by almost all of the people I contacted I did
manage to talk with a computer technician who was familiar with the computers
and printers used by the Department of Health and the clerk’s offices. He was
unwilling to give any specific details but did provide enough information to
work with. The COLB certificates are printed directly in the clerk’s office at
the time they are requested. The system uses a standard laser printer and the
border is printed at the same time as the text and other images on top of
preprinted security paper. He stated the border is a vector image and would
appear crisp and defined. When asked if a COLB can be printed off center he
said it was not possible and any misfeed would simply jam in the printer. When
asked if he had seen the images on-line he
replied that he had – and that there is “no way” they had printed something
that looked like that which further backed up my conclusions. Now let’s start to
put the pieces of the puzzle together. The KOS
image security border pattern does not match any known specimen from any known
year. It does not match the pre-2006 nor does it match the post-2006
certificate patterns. The placement of the text in all of the pre-2006 and
post-2006 certificates are almost identical pixel location matches while the image’s text placement does not match any known
specimen from any known year. The shape and kerning of the fonts used in the
2006 through 2008 certificates are identical while the shape and kerning of the
fonts used in the image does not match any
known specimen. The KOS image shows clear signs of tampering such as the
mismatch in RGB and error levels, visible indications of the previous location
of the erased security border, easily detectable patterns of repeating flaws
around the new security border, EXIF data that says the image was last saved
with Photoshop CS3 for Macintosh, and finally a technician from Hawaii who
confirms it just looks wrong.
There are two
obvious scenarios used to create the image
that can be ascertained from evidence. Either a real COLB was scanned into
Photoshop and digitally edited or a real COLB was first scanned to obtain the
graphic layout then blanked by soaking the document in solvent to remove the
toner. After rescanning the blank page to a separate image the graphics from
the previously obtained scan could then be easily applied to the blank scan
after some editing and rebuilding. It would also explain why date stamp bleeds through
the paper and the various bits of toner located around the image as well as the
remnants of the previous location of a security border.
So as I have been
saying repeatedly since I first compared the KOS
images to the Decosta image using the same tests and measurements – the image is a horrible forgery.
Previously at Atlas:
FORENSIC EXPERT: "the [birth] certificate is still a horrible forgery"
Mystery, Clarification and Obfuscation of Obama's Birth Certificate Forgery
Atlas Tech Expert Declares Obama Birth Certificate ...
Who died and made him the final word on Obama's ...
The "Missing" Obama Birth Certificate Seal 6/29/08
SUCH A LIAR: OBAMA'S FAKE BIRTH CERTIFICATE 6/26/08
RELEASE OBAMA'S BIRTH CERTIFICATE! 6/10/08
****Must Cite Pamela Geller and link back to Atlas ****(play nice and honest).
UPDATE: Techdude added this in the comment section:
..some folks asked for it...so
here are MORE screen shots. I uploaded a few from the 2001 and 2003
COLB tests and the animated gifs showing the fun pulsating kerning
differences ala LGF style.
I assume no one has been able to figure out why the "2007" KOS image
manages to have the same placement as a 2003 COLB and not a 2006, 2007,
or 2008 COLB yet huh? How about the remnants of the previous border
location? Humm...and what about that mis-matching uncentered border
with obvious 2 pixel white spaces between the top and bottom headers?
Any more novel theories? Space aliens? Right wing conspiracies? Oh I
know...it must have all been a "satire" of a real one.
Decosta error level
Decosta RGB Heat map
2003 RGB Heat map
2007 on KOS animated - kerning differences
Animated gif - kerning differences
2003 over 2007
2007 overlay on Decosta
UPDATE: Israeli Insider weighs in here
