I predict that they will use the all the tools at their disposal to attack the fabric of American life using their Negro Hordes and the Antifa Thugs as their front line of attack and the Democrat run Cities like Chicago and Baltimore and New York will become hell holes of looting and violence. The Politicians will do nothing and will work to destabilize America.
Mark my words they will not start it. They will incrementally take away our freedoms a little at a time hope that most will not notice until it is too late to fight back.
We must start the counter attack incrementally as well. A protest here... a beating of an Alphabet Agency goon there. Asymmetrical warfare is the only way we have a chance to counter the intelligence gathering apparatus of the Illegal Government forces! Will we be ready or will whine as usual? Will our Conservative talking heads do more than write books and whine on radio and TV?
The terrified Conservatives will call anyone calling for the fight a "Fed" or a Government Tool. Its their defense to stay cowards and do nothing to fight back. Some of these Faux Conservatives are really the Government Propagandists themselves calling us names to cover their own propaganda. Call them out!
We are the ONLY line of defense there is! Unless we mobilize now we will be caught flat footed!
George Soros https://john-gaultier.blogspot.com/2019/04/read-why-george-soros-is-enemy-of.html and his hundred of little companies names all kinds of different names all with the same purpose have been using his money and our laziness and ignorance to chip away at our freedoms and our Constitution. Read through my blog www.john-gaultier.blogspot.com and you will see all the various tricks they have used. BUT enough of all that.
As you have seen with the roll out of the FAKE UKRAINE IMPEACHMENT SCHEME.. THIS IS WAR. DONALD TRUMP ACTUALLY SAID THAT!
Its time to mobilize!
George Soros https://john-gaultier.blogspot.com/2019/04/read-why-george-soros-is-enemy-of.html and his hundred of little companies names all kinds of different names all with the same purpose have been using his money and our laziness and ignorance to chip away at our freedoms and our Constitution. Read through my blog www.john-gaultier.blogspot.com and you will see all the various tricks they have used. BUT enough of all that.
As you have seen with the roll out of the FAKE UKRAINE IMPEACHMENT SCHEME.. THIS IS WAR. DONALD TRUMP ACTUALLY SAID THAT!
Its time to mobilize!
Every city every town needs to start putting together MAGA
BATTALIONS. Patriotic former Military men who were colonels or higher rank with
experience in fighting in cities need to step up and start meeting volunteers
who have credibility and vouchability.. and train them. This battle will take
place on city blocks and not battle fields.. it will be in places that feel like
Falouja and not the Rice paddies of Vietnam. The techniques and tactics are
different.
We will join active duty military to fight the Socialist
Hordes!
How do we do that ? Here is a Primer>
What a MAGA BATTALION Megacities Unit Would Look Like!
In an American Civil war to be fought for the Control of our destiny.. MAKE NO MISTAKE IT WILL BE FOUGHT IN THE CITIES. THE FARM LAND AND THE SUBURBS WILL BELONG TO THE PATRIOT BRIGADES.
But we still do not have units that are even remotely prepared to operate in megacities. If we want to find success on the urban battlefields the US Army and or Maga Battalions will inevitably find itself fighting on in the future, that needs to change.
Throughout history, military forces either sought to avoid or simply had no need to engage in urban combat. Most military doctrine, and the strategic theory it is built upon, encourages land forces to bypass, lay siege to, or—if required—isolate and slowly clear cities from the outside in. The great armies of the world have historically fought for cities rather than in cities, a distinction with a significant difference. In cases where military forces had no choice but to operate within cities, the environment, almost without exception, proved very costly in both military and civilian casualties. Today, many armies have accepted that global population growth and urbanization trends will increasingly force military operations into crowded cities, and military forces must therefore be capable of conducting the full range of operations in large, dense urban areas. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Milley recently remarked that the Army “has been designed, manned, trained and equipped for the last 241 years to operate primarily in rural areas.” But that is about to change. Milley continued:
A 2016 United Nations report estimated 54.5 percent of the world’s population lived in urban areas. By 2030, that percentage is projected to rise to 60 percent. As a result of this rural-to-urban migration, cities themselves are growing. In 2016, there were 512 cities with at least one million inhabitants globally. By 2030, a projected 662 cities will have at least one million residents. And the number of “megacities” in the world—those with ten million residents or more—is projected to grow from thirty-one to forty-one in the same period.
In 2014, the chief of staff of the Army’s Strategic Studies Group (SSG) chose megacities to be the organizing theme for its yearlong research projects. Concept teams looked at the unique characteristics and challenges of a megacity, future maneuver and mobility concepts, Army force design considerations, personnel talent management, and other topics, assessing the requirements for operating in megacities. The conclusions of the SSG research are clear: megacities are unavoidable, they are potentially the most challenging environment the Army has ever faced, and the Army is unprepared to operate in them. The SSG also recommended that the Army, charged with the mandate of preparing forces for sustained operations on land, take the lead in training, organizing, and equipping forces for megacities.
As William Adamson noted in his 2015 Parameters article, “Megacities and the US Army,” the research conducted by the SSG was not the first to take a long and hard look at the challenges of large urban areas. Adamson highlighted a 2000 Government Accounting Office report, which noted that “despite a growing unease that the urban environment is a known vulnerability of US forces, DoD has not made a major commitment to dramatically improve urban capabilities.” Shortly after this, the 2001 Defense Planning Guidance commissioned a study and eighteen-month project that resulted in the Joint Urban Operations (JUO) Master Plan 2012–2017.
Interest in the megacities problem did not stop after the SSG study. The Army’s 2014 Unified Quest wargames included megacities scenarios in its study of future operational environments. The US Army Training and Doctrine Command’s Mad Scientist project continues to look at technological solutions to the challenges posed by megacities. Multiple organizations and agencies continue to assess the Army’s capabilities gaps through the standard Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) framework.
But despite all of this study, no change has been made to the Army of today to prepare for tomorrow’s operations in megacities—a tomorrow that could be here very soon.
One ongoing military study of megacities is the NATO Urbanization Project. Initiated in 2014, it is a conceptual study of potential crisis situations in urban systems, consequences of urbanization, and the impact on NATO military operations. The project includes seventeen NATO nations, sixteen NATO Centers of Excellence, and representatives of academia and industry.
In the project’s most recent experiment, the NATO team conducted a wargame to determine the capabilities needed to achieve the goals of three likely missions in 2035: response to mass migration, natural disaster, and inner-city turmoil. Within these missions, the wargame specified that a brigade conduct three operations in a megacity—joint forcible entry, major combat, and subsequent stability operations—without unacceptable levels of military or civilian casualties. On top of identifying capabilities gaps in mobility, command and control, and intelligence, the study found that normal employment concepts and force packages for a brigade were wholly inadequate. In future experiments, game participants will be given 5,000 personnel (the high end of a conventional brigade’s manpower) and asked to design a force specifically for the urban environment.
Training, manning, and equipping a 5,000-soldier force to specialize in urban operations would be a novel concept; no military force in the world has attempted this endeavor despite the well-documented challenges of military operations in dense urban terrain.
The US Army purposely avoids specialization. The Army’s Brigade Combat Team (BCT) structure of light infantry, mechanized infantry, and armored formations are specifically designed for global deployment to conduct any and all missions. While these “general purpose forces” may be designed for major combat operations against near-peer adversaries, they are expected to be able to adapt their force structure to any enemy in any environment.
There are a few exceptions—like the Army’s 75th Ranger Regiment, designed for “large-scale joint forcible entry operations while simultaneously executing surgical special operations raids across the globe.” But the “general purpose” rule holds true for the bulk of Army units. For example, even BCTs that are given special peacetime missions, like those that serve as the opposing force at one of the Army’s three combat training centers or testing modernization concepts and equipment, are required to maintain readiness for wartime missions just like any other unit in the Army. But the degree of specialized training, manning, and equipment required to effectively fight in megacities is incompatible with the “general purpose” approach.
Of course, urban warfare is not exclusively a future phenomenon. Much has been learned from urban battles in recent history: the Siege of Sarajevo (1992–95); the Battle of Mogadishu (1993); Russian operations in Grozny (1994–95 and 1999–2000); US operations in Baghdad (2003) and Fallujah (2004); Lebanese operations in Nahr al-Bared, Lebanon (2007); and the Second Battle of Donetsk (2014–15). But the broad lessons of these cases have yet to truly inform Army training for urban combat, which for most units consists mainly of tactical training (e.g., room clearing drills with four-man teams). The Army would be much better served by the creation of an entire unit dedicated to preparing to operate in dense urban environments, particularly megacities.
The lessons from recent cases of urban warfare and the many studies on the unique requirements posed by operating in a megacity can be used to design such a unit today. Starting from scratch, a unit could be built based on the specific requirements we know a megacity would call for. The unit leadership would need extreme flexibility and authority in manning, staffing, and equipping. The first attempt will inevitably not be right. But it will be a starting point from which to examine remaining unanswered questions: What are the necessary skills of an urban warrior? What is the right mix of enablers and cross-trained soldiers? What are the best movement and maneuver techniques? If megacities represent a unique unit of analysis, how will that inform this new unit’s mission planning?
We know we will be fighting in megacities and that it will pose major new challenges. Successfully meeting these challenges requires bold action—and requires it now. A new unit would serve as the primary learning organization for the Army and the vanguard of development of planning and doctrine for fighting in megacities.
Both recent studies and global trends forecast the unavoidable deployment of military forces to achieve national objectives in megacities. Given this, committing 5,000 soldiers to man, train, and equip a unit designed specifically to prepare for such a deployment would be a bold insurance plan, and the right choice.
SO...
One of the principal counterarguments is that any discussion of the Army’s future role in megacity operations is pointless. Operating in such a complex domain is an impossible mission and, therefore, not one we will undertake. But there are many scenarios, including natural disaster situations, that would—despite the most concerted efforts to avoid them—call for the use of military forces in megacities to protect national interests. Even Gen. Mark Milley has stated that the Army must be prepared to operate in dense urban terrain. Given the range of potential unforeseen events that could pull us into megacities and the service leadership’s views, the Army should organize, train, and equip units for these operations.
Megacities cannot be ruled no-go areas for military forces. The intent of the Army as outlined by U.S.C. Title 10 is to be “capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces, of—(1) preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense, of the United States, the Commonwealths and possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States; (2) supporting the national policies; (3) implementing the national objectives; and (4) overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States.” These are global requirements. And the globe is increasingly made up of megacities. As I pointed out in my first article, by 2030 there will be 662 cities around the world with at least one million inhabitants (compared to 512 today) and 60 percent of the world’s population will live in cities. The potential for operations in dense urban areas will rise correspondingly, presenting a challenge the Army cannot ignore.
Another counterargument is that the 5,000-soldier unit I proposed would never be enough—that a megacity operation is an Army corps-level mission or that a city of ten million inhabitants would swallow any size unit. These criticisms argue essentially that megacities are simply too challenging for military forces. I agree that for a range of missions and situations, a single brigade of 5,000 soliders would not be enough. But there is also an array of feasible missions where a single brigade could achieve military objectives. The point is that creating and experimenting with a unit focused on preparing for operations in a megacity would provide insights across the DOTMLPF-P (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy) framework that will inform the entire Army’s planning and training. During urban contingencies, the unit would serve as the vanguard of the opening phase of the operation.
I chose a 5,000-soldier unit because that is roughly equivalent to the largest US Army Brigade Combat Team (a Stryker BCT, with 4,500). I also chose it because the BCT is the major combat force element used as the “building block” for Army and joint operations in Defense Planning Scenarios or Strategic Choices and Management Reviews to determine force structure. The Army also uses BCTs in Unified Quest wargames and its Deep Futures exercises to identify capability gaps and solutions to future challenges. The BCT is the unit of measure.
One of the first steps towards imagining a megacity unit is to provide a probable scenario and define the missions the unit would be designed and trained to accomplish. The scenario used by the NATO Urbanization Project seminar wargame is a good start. The wargame envisioned three missions: joint forcible entry; combat operations (offensive and defensive) against conventional, hybrid, and unconventional threats; and security operations after a man-made disaster to stabilize, secure, and facilitate the transition of efforts to a follow-on force. These missions could be used to develop and prioritize the new unit’s mission essential task list.
By using a current brigade force package, each of the unit’s warfighting functions of mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection can be tailored and assessed against the challenges of military operations in dense urban areas, particularly megacities. A Stryker Brigade Combat Team is an appropriate starting point to build out a megacities unit because it was designed to address many of the gaps between light infantry and heavier armor brigades. Many of the Stryker BCT’s design attributes—speed, deployability, robust infantry forces, mobile protected firepower, and advanced technologies—will be needed in a megacities unit. So what subordinate units would such a unit include?
3 Battalions of Mobile Infantry
1 Armor Battalion
1 Support Battalion
The urban BCT would be different in other important ways than today’s BCTs, specifically in their organizational commitment to three principles.
Rapid experimentation, structure changes, and equipment fielding. The urban BCT will provide an organizational base for rapid experimentation, equipment fielding, and structural change. The unit would need advanced capabilities from Army and Department of Defense labs, academia, and industry. Many of the proposed soldier and unit enhancements, such as robotics, population mapping, sensors, scalable-effects weapons and munitions, and soldier and command networked communication and control systems, could all be inserted for experimentation and testing while training for megacity operations.
The proposed urban BCT structure, outlined here, is only a starting point. Brigade combat teams are force packages that have, as one of their core design principles, the ability to adapt to a wide range of environments. A megacity unit must be designed with a capability one step further—not only to evolve in response to our constantly refined understanding of the unique requirements of big cities, but to evolve rapidly to fit the needs of each city’s unique characteristics once deployed. Unlike existing units that conduct experimentation, such as the brigade that until recently was permanently assigned to the Joint Modernization Command, which must maintain their BCT organization, a megacity unit would need authorities to radically and rapidly change its organization. The unit would also need addition funding lines in its authorizations to support changes.
Unit personnel management exceptions to policy. BCTs are not only the Army’s building blocks, but also a key Army leader development tool. Almost every officer in a brigade is doing on-the-job training because he or she has never held that particular position before. This practice is a great strength but also takes away from unit performance. In the 75th Ranger Regiment, officers are accepted for a position only after successfully executing that position’s duties in a previous unit. The need for this unit to quickly develop a capability not resident in the Army today means that it should have a similar policy.
The unit would also need compulsory release authority. Lessons from experiments like the Network Integration Evaluation and different battle lab experiments show that some soldiers thrive with new weapons, technology, and multiple feeds of information; others do not.
Study group. The complexities of megacities and the dilemma of military operations within them have been studied by the Army since 2013. Operations in urban terrain more broadly have been studied multiple times before that. Wargames, conferences, writing contests, tabletop discussions, and experiments have been conducted. But not much has actually been done with the fruits of these efforts. For a megacity unit to constantly adapt based on ongoing refinements of our understanding of the domain, it needs a small, diverse group of permanently assigned experts committed to studying, learning, capturing lessons, and developing doctrine for megacities.
__________________________________________________
FYI Maj. John Spencer is a scholar with the Modern War Institute at the United States Military Academy in West Point, NY. A former Ranger Instructor, he has held the ranks of private to sergeant first class and lieutenant to major while serving in ranger, airborne, light, and mechanized infantry units during his 23 years as an infantryman.
How do we do that ? Here is a Primer>
What a MAGA BATTALION Megacities Unit Would Look Like!
(I have copied some excellent pointers from John Spencer)
Every year, more and more of the world’s population moves into cities. The number of megacities is growing exponentially. Both of these global patterns and their inevitable consequences for military operations are well documented.
In an American Civil war to be fought for the Control of our destiny.. MAKE NO MISTAKE IT WILL BE FOUGHT IN THE CITIES. THE FARM LAND AND THE SUBURBS WILL BELONG TO THE PATRIOT BRIGADES.
But we still do not have units that are even remotely prepared to operate in megacities. If we want to find success on the urban battlefields the US Army and or Maga Battalions will inevitably find itself fighting on in the future, that needs to change.
Throughout history, military forces either sought to avoid or simply had no need to engage in urban combat. Most military doctrine, and the strategic theory it is built upon, encourages land forces to bypass, lay siege to, or—if required—isolate and slowly clear cities from the outside in. The great armies of the world have historically fought for cities rather than in cities, a distinction with a significant difference. In cases where military forces had no choice but to operate within cities, the environment, almost without exception, proved very costly in both military and civilian casualties. Today, many armies have accepted that global population growth and urbanization trends will increasingly force military operations into crowded cities, and military forces must therefore be capable of conducting the full range of operations in large, dense urban areas. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Milley recently remarked that the Army “has been designed, manned, trained and equipped for the last 241 years to operate primarily in rural areas.” But that is about to change. Milley continued:
In the future, I can say with very high degrees of confidence, the American Army is probably going to be fighting in urban areas. . . . We need to man, organize, train and equip the force for operations in urban areas, highly dense urban areas, and that’s a different construct. We’re not organized like that right now.But despite the clear recognition that armed forces will increasingly be required to fight in urban areas, no army has committed to train, organize, and equip forces specifically to operate in cities. It is time for the US Army and Maga Batallions to do just that.
A 2016 United Nations report estimated 54.5 percent of the world’s population lived in urban areas. By 2030, that percentage is projected to rise to 60 percent. As a result of this rural-to-urban migration, cities themselves are growing. In 2016, there were 512 cities with at least one million inhabitants globally. By 2030, a projected 662 cities will have at least one million residents. And the number of “megacities” in the world—those with ten million residents or more—is projected to grow from thirty-one to forty-one in the same period.
In 2014, the chief of staff of the Army’s Strategic Studies Group (SSG) chose megacities to be the organizing theme for its yearlong research projects. Concept teams looked at the unique characteristics and challenges of a megacity, future maneuver and mobility concepts, Army force design considerations, personnel talent management, and other topics, assessing the requirements for operating in megacities. The conclusions of the SSG research are clear: megacities are unavoidable, they are potentially the most challenging environment the Army has ever faced, and the Army is unprepared to operate in them. The SSG also recommended that the Army, charged with the mandate of preparing forces for sustained operations on land, take the lead in training, organizing, and equipping forces for megacities.
As William Adamson noted in his 2015 Parameters article, “Megacities and the US Army,” the research conducted by the SSG was not the first to take a long and hard look at the challenges of large urban areas. Adamson highlighted a 2000 Government Accounting Office report, which noted that “despite a growing unease that the urban environment is a known vulnerability of US forces, DoD has not made a major commitment to dramatically improve urban capabilities.” Shortly after this, the 2001 Defense Planning Guidance commissioned a study and eighteen-month project that resulted in the Joint Urban Operations (JUO) Master Plan 2012–2017.
Interest in the megacities problem did not stop after the SSG study. The Army’s 2014 Unified Quest wargames included megacities scenarios in its study of future operational environments. The US Army Training and Doctrine Command’s Mad Scientist project continues to look at technological solutions to the challenges posed by megacities. Multiple organizations and agencies continue to assess the Army’s capabilities gaps through the standard Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) framework.
But despite all of this study, no change has been made to the Army of today to prepare for tomorrow’s operations in megacities—a tomorrow that could be here very soon.
One ongoing military study of megacities is the NATO Urbanization Project. Initiated in 2014, it is a conceptual study of potential crisis situations in urban systems, consequences of urbanization, and the impact on NATO military operations. The project includes seventeen NATO nations, sixteen NATO Centers of Excellence, and representatives of academia and industry.
In the project’s most recent experiment, the NATO team conducted a wargame to determine the capabilities needed to achieve the goals of three likely missions in 2035: response to mass migration, natural disaster, and inner-city turmoil. Within these missions, the wargame specified that a brigade conduct three operations in a megacity—joint forcible entry, major combat, and subsequent stability operations—without unacceptable levels of military or civilian casualties. On top of identifying capabilities gaps in mobility, command and control, and intelligence, the study found that normal employment concepts and force packages for a brigade were wholly inadequate. In future experiments, game participants will be given 5,000 personnel (the high end of a conventional brigade’s manpower) and asked to design a force specifically for the urban environment.
Training, manning, and equipping a 5,000-soldier force to specialize in urban operations would be a novel concept; no military force in the world has attempted this endeavor despite the well-documented challenges of military operations in dense urban terrain.
The US Army purposely avoids specialization. The Army’s Brigade Combat Team (BCT) structure of light infantry, mechanized infantry, and armored formations are specifically designed for global deployment to conduct any and all missions. While these “general purpose forces” may be designed for major combat operations against near-peer adversaries, they are expected to be able to adapt their force structure to any enemy in any environment.
There are a few exceptions—like the Army’s 75th Ranger Regiment, designed for “large-scale joint forcible entry operations while simultaneously executing surgical special operations raids across the globe.” But the “general purpose” rule holds true for the bulk of Army units. For example, even BCTs that are given special peacetime missions, like those that serve as the opposing force at one of the Army’s three combat training centers or testing modernization concepts and equipment, are required to maintain readiness for wartime missions just like any other unit in the Army. But the degree of specialized training, manning, and equipment required to effectively fight in megacities is incompatible with the “general purpose” approach.
Of course, urban warfare is not exclusively a future phenomenon. Much has been learned from urban battles in recent history: the Siege of Sarajevo (1992–95); the Battle of Mogadishu (1993); Russian operations in Grozny (1994–95 and 1999–2000); US operations in Baghdad (2003) and Fallujah (2004); Lebanese operations in Nahr al-Bared, Lebanon (2007); and the Second Battle of Donetsk (2014–15). But the broad lessons of these cases have yet to truly inform Army training for urban combat, which for most units consists mainly of tactical training (e.g., room clearing drills with four-man teams). The Army would be much better served by the creation of an entire unit dedicated to preparing to operate in dense urban environments, particularly megacities.
The lessons from recent cases of urban warfare and the many studies on the unique requirements posed by operating in a megacity can be used to design such a unit today. Starting from scratch, a unit could be built based on the specific requirements we know a megacity would call for. The unit leadership would need extreme flexibility and authority in manning, staffing, and equipping. The first attempt will inevitably not be right. But it will be a starting point from which to examine remaining unanswered questions: What are the necessary skills of an urban warrior? What is the right mix of enablers and cross-trained soldiers? What are the best movement and maneuver techniques? If megacities represent a unique unit of analysis, how will that inform this new unit’s mission planning?
We know we will be fighting in megacities and that it will pose major new challenges. Successfully meeting these challenges requires bold action—and requires it now. A new unit would serve as the primary learning organization for the Army and the vanguard of development of planning and doctrine for fighting in megacities.
Both recent studies and global trends forecast the unavoidable deployment of military forces to achieve national objectives in megacities. Given this, committing 5,000 soldiers to man, train, and equip a unit designed specifically to prepare for such a deployment would be a bold insurance plan, and the right choice.
SO...
One of the principal counterarguments is that any discussion of the Army’s future role in megacity operations is pointless. Operating in such a complex domain is an impossible mission and, therefore, not one we will undertake. But there are many scenarios, including natural disaster situations, that would—despite the most concerted efforts to avoid them—call for the use of military forces in megacities to protect national interests. Even Gen. Mark Milley has stated that the Army must be prepared to operate in dense urban terrain. Given the range of potential unforeseen events that could pull us into megacities and the service leadership’s views, the Army should organize, train, and equip units for these operations.
Megacities cannot be ruled no-go areas for military forces. The intent of the Army as outlined by U.S.C. Title 10 is to be “capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces, of—(1) preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense, of the United States, the Commonwealths and possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States; (2) supporting the national policies; (3) implementing the national objectives; and (4) overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States.” These are global requirements. And the globe is increasingly made up of megacities. As I pointed out in my first article, by 2030 there will be 662 cities around the world with at least one million inhabitants (compared to 512 today) and 60 percent of the world’s population will live in cities. The potential for operations in dense urban areas will rise correspondingly, presenting a challenge the Army cannot ignore.
Another counterargument is that the 5,000-soldier unit I proposed would never be enough—that a megacity operation is an Army corps-level mission or that a city of ten million inhabitants would swallow any size unit. These criticisms argue essentially that megacities are simply too challenging for military forces. I agree that for a range of missions and situations, a single brigade of 5,000 soliders would not be enough. But there is also an array of feasible missions where a single brigade could achieve military objectives. The point is that creating and experimenting with a unit focused on preparing for operations in a megacity would provide insights across the DOTMLPF-P (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy) framework that will inform the entire Army’s planning and training. During urban contingencies, the unit would serve as the vanguard of the opening phase of the operation.
I chose a 5,000-soldier unit because that is roughly equivalent to the largest US Army Brigade Combat Team (a Stryker BCT, with 4,500). I also chose it because the BCT is the major combat force element used as the “building block” for Army and joint operations in Defense Planning Scenarios or Strategic Choices and Management Reviews to determine force structure. The Army also uses BCTs in Unified Quest wargames and its Deep Futures exercises to identify capability gaps and solutions to future challenges. The BCT is the unit of measure.
One of the first steps towards imagining a megacity unit is to provide a probable scenario and define the missions the unit would be designed and trained to accomplish. The scenario used by the NATO Urbanization Project seminar wargame is a good start. The wargame envisioned three missions: joint forcible entry; combat operations (offensive and defensive) against conventional, hybrid, and unconventional threats; and security operations after a man-made disaster to stabilize, secure, and facilitate the transition of efforts to a follow-on force. These missions could be used to develop and prioritize the new unit’s mission essential task list.
By using a current brigade force package, each of the unit’s warfighting functions of mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection can be tailored and assessed against the challenges of military operations in dense urban areas, particularly megacities. A Stryker Brigade Combat Team is an appropriate starting point to build out a megacities unit because it was designed to address many of the gaps between light infantry and heavier armor brigades. Many of the Stryker BCT’s design attributes—speed, deployability, robust infantry forces, mobile protected firepower, and advanced technologies—will be needed in a megacities unit. So what subordinate units would such a unit include?
3 Battalions of Mobile Infantry
Each battalion would be airborne to
facilitate forcible entry operations when needed. (Drop zones in
megacities are necessarily limited, but even the densest cities have
airfields, parks, or even landfills.) Until a new infantry fighting
vehicle is fielded for the urban environment, two battalions would have
Strykers and one would have Bradley Fighting Vehicles. These platforms
provide dismounted infantry the integrated high-angle protected
firepower necessary to meet the extreme elevation requirements of urban
terrain. These mobile firepower platforms should continue to be integrated with evolving guided, scalable (adjustable multi-purpose warheads) missile systems.
The ability to maneuver forces is one of
the biggest challenges of the dense urban environment. New combat
vehicle platforms will be needed. The Abrams tank, Bradley, and Stryker
range in width from eight to twelve feet. Many of the developing cities
of the world are built upon ancient infrastructure with narrow
roads—like central Baghdad’s Adhamiyah District. Others have vast tracts of unplanned and chaotically organized networks of similarly narrow passageways—like Mumbai’s Dharavi slum. Such constraints require dismounted infantry to separate from their mobile protective fire. When I first heard hover bikes
mentioned for military operations, I was extremely skeptical. But with
highly trained soldiers, equipped with weaponry, and protection, these
vehicles or others with similarly small size and high maneuverability
would be measurably more valuable than current vehicles that are simply
too big to operate in dense terrain.
The ability to communicate with the
population will also become a requirement. The tactical use of social
media, internet, and co-opted local networks (like emergency alert
systems) will be needed, but equally important will be the skills to
develop the right message—language, culture, narrative. Military Information Support Operations units have historically not been a component of maneuver units but should be made organic, instead of a requested enabler.
It is clear that megacities will require
major changes to today’s fighting vehicles, weapons, and equipment.
Every aspect of the “shoot, move, and communicate” framework is
challenged by the urban environment. Current systems will have to be
modified, new capabilities and technologies implemented. Depression and
elevation capabilities of weapons will have to be increased. The
paradigm of adaptable organizational design of fighting formations will
be challenged in every aspect, from equipment design to the formations
themselves.
A tank battalion trained for the
specifics of urban warfare is crucial. Yes, they’re too big and too
unwieldy for large sections of dense cities—but not entire cities. And
where they can be brought to bear, they can offer the necessary decisive
advantage on the urban battlefield. Historical urban warfare case studies repeatedly show the demand for mobile, protected firepower.
The ability to combine armor and infantry
into decentralized fighting teams, with armor supporting infantry,
infantry supporting armor, has been shown
to be key to success in urban fighting. An army that can execute
combined arms maneuver with precision indirect fire and air support
overwhelms enemies even in urban terrain.
Israeli troops, supported by a tank, conduct operations in Nablus. (Credit: Israel Defense Forces)
Urban operations demand decentralized,
small-unit operations at the tactical level, with junior leaders capable
of operating independently. Much of the fighting in Iraq was by
company- and platoon-level teams of infantry, armor, aviation, sniper,
and intelligence, all combined at the lowest level under the command of
captains and lieutenants.
The three infantry battalions and one
armor battalion should be trained much like the combined-arms Armor
Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs) deployed to Iraq. These would be companies
of Strykers, Bradley, and tanks platoons with organic intelligence teams
and enablers to conduct independent operations within the cities.
1 Fires Battalion
Much has been learned and continues to be
learned from the current fight in Mosul, Iraq about the integration of
fire support to maximize effectiveness, while minimizing collateral
damage, through the use of precision joint fires.
War in a megacity will also require protection systems. The counter–unmanned aircraft systems
(C-UAS) mission is quickly becoming a vital capability requirement in
urban warfare. Current conflict zones like Iraq and Ukraine show a
growing use and weaponization of civilian UAS. Both members of the Army and members of Congress have recognized the immediate requirement for a new “highly maneuverable, short-range air defense system” to protect soldiers from enemy drones, helicopters, and attack aircraft.
1 Multifunctional Engineer Battalion
Engineers tailored for urban warfare must
have enhanced capabilities for mobility and counter-mobility. In
particular, they need to be able to emplace obstacles (e.g., concrete walls)
to isolate enemy forces, canalize enemy movement to facilitate
targeting, and deny access to critical or high-risk areas. Urban terrain
also allows for complex obstacles to be emplaced. Doing so—and reducing obstacles—places engineers at the forefront of urban operations.
Army engineers emplace concrete T-walls along Main Supply Route Tampa in Iraq. (Credit: Spc. Kiyoshi Freeman, US Army)
The use of “mouse holing,”
creating holes in walls to allow soldiers to move between adjacent
buildings rather than exposing themselves on the street, has been seen
in many urban battles. This is just one example of a mobility tactic
unique to urban terrain, which an environment-specific engineer unit
could further develop.
The battalion would also need licensed
professional civil engineers. This qualification is an added individual
development goal in existing engineer units, but not a unit capability.
Knowledge of civil works will be critical to military operations in
dense urban terrain. We learned the hard way in Iraq how infrastructure
destruction hampers military efforts in population-centric conflicts.
This will be even more true in megacities, where understanding and
protecting immensely complex critical infrastructure networks could be
as important as protecting the population.
1 Multifunctional Aviation Battalion
Operations in a megacity will require
many of the same aviation capabilities of attack, reconnaissance,
assault, and medical evacuation used in operations in less dense
terrain, but with considerable constraints. Megacities offer limited
landing and pickup zones. Flying close enough to soldiers on the ground
to provide air support is made more difficult by powerlines, antennas
and satellites on rooftops, and narrow flight patterns between
buildings. There is high risk to slow-moving aircraft from small-arms
fire and rocket-propelled grenades. Current developments in aviation
armament systems and vertical lift for precision personnel and cargo
resupply would be a significant addition to a standard aviation unit.
Rooftops in Cairo. (Credit: Myrna Machuca-Sierra)
The complexities of a megacity are not
confined to mobility and maneuver. Providing support, services, and
maintenance to decentralized units will be difficult. It will require
support organizations with more capabilities than they have today, such
as rapid prototyping to allow the unit to evolve quickly as our
understanding of the environment’s requirements change; on-demand
additive manufacturing to increase self-sufficiency; and drone resupply
and transport to make up for the restrictions on manned aviation
platforms.
1 Military Intelligence Battalion
Wargames and studies
demonstrate the heightened intelligence demands of military operations
in megacities. The ability to understand the enemy, terrain, weather,
and civilian considerations cannot happen without a robust military
intelligence capability. With the increased density of both people and
infrastructure, there is also an increased information density, creating
unique intelligence challenges and more challenging intelligence
requirements. For this reason, a megacities unit should have an entire
intelligence battalion instead of the existing military intelligence
company organic to BCTs.
A megacity-focused military intelligence
package would need to include robust human intelligence collection
capabilities, including social media. Enhanced tactical signals
intelligence capabilities would allow for more rapid targeting,
necessary in a highly dynamic urban environment. And dedicated reach
back channels should be created where either collection or analysis
resources cannot be pushed to the BCT level, so as to further speed the
F3EAD process (find–fix–finish–exploit–analyze).
Decentralized small units would need
intelligence capabilities currently in battalion and BCT headquarters.
Intelligence officers should be assigned to every maneuver company. The
creation of Company Intelligence Support Teams (COIST) demonstrated
great results in Iraq. COISTs were discontinued in the current BCT
modernization plans, but should be included in the BCT built for urban
operations. The military intelligence battalion should therefore be
organized in a modular fashion, so resources can be flexed to individual
COISTs on a rapid, needs-based basis.
1 Cyber Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA) Battalion
The particulars of a CEMA
unit is still in development, but the diverse capabilities being
combined are the exact capabilities that will be needed at the tactical
level in a hyper-connected complex city. Electronic Warfare
capabilities to detect, jam, and deceive enemy sensors and
communications, while protecting the unit’s own GPS, communications, and
control technologies is critical. Offensive and defensive tactical
cyber capabilities are also necessary.
1 Explosive Ordnance (EOD) Battalion
EOD will be present in all tactical
operations of an urban unit, rather than an attached capability as it is
today. The BCT’s survivability will depend on EOD capabilities in dense
urban areas where improvised explosive devices and booby-trapped
structures and drones
have become common. Like the military intelligence battalion, this
should be a modular unit, capable of operating centralized and in
support of the BCT commander’s overall mission, or broken up to
integrate fully with units down to the platoon and even squad level.
This force package would allow for the forming of multi-domain combat
teams (infantry, armor, cyber, intelligence, information operations)
all the way down to the company and platoon level needed to operate and
win in megacities and dense urban terrain.The urban BCT would be different in other important ways than today’s BCTs, specifically in their organizational commitment to three principles.
Rapid experimentation, structure changes, and equipment fielding. The urban BCT will provide an organizational base for rapid experimentation, equipment fielding, and structural change. The unit would need advanced capabilities from Army and Department of Defense labs, academia, and industry. Many of the proposed soldier and unit enhancements, such as robotics, population mapping, sensors, scalable-effects weapons and munitions, and soldier and command networked communication and control systems, could all be inserted for experimentation and testing while training for megacity operations.
The proposed urban BCT structure, outlined here, is only a starting point. Brigade combat teams are force packages that have, as one of their core design principles, the ability to adapt to a wide range of environments. A megacity unit must be designed with a capability one step further—not only to evolve in response to our constantly refined understanding of the unique requirements of big cities, but to evolve rapidly to fit the needs of each city’s unique characteristics once deployed. Unlike existing units that conduct experimentation, such as the brigade that until recently was permanently assigned to the Joint Modernization Command, which must maintain their BCT organization, a megacity unit would need authorities to radically and rapidly change its organization. The unit would also need addition funding lines in its authorizations to support changes.
Unit personnel management exceptions to policy. BCTs are not only the Army’s building blocks, but also a key Army leader development tool. Almost every officer in a brigade is doing on-the-job training because he or she has never held that particular position before. This practice is a great strength but also takes away from unit performance. In the 75th Ranger Regiment, officers are accepted for a position only after successfully executing that position’s duties in a previous unit. The need for this unit to quickly develop a capability not resident in the Army today means that it should have a similar policy.
The unit would also need compulsory release authority. Lessons from experiments like the Network Integration Evaluation and different battle lab experiments show that some soldiers thrive with new weapons, technology, and multiple feeds of information; others do not.
Study group. The complexities of megacities and the dilemma of military operations within them have been studied by the Army since 2013. Operations in urban terrain more broadly have been studied multiple times before that. Wargames, conferences, writing contests, tabletop discussions, and experiments have been conducted. But not much has actually been done with the fruits of these efforts. For a megacity unit to constantly adapt based on ongoing refinements of our understanding of the domain, it needs a small, diverse group of permanently assigned experts committed to studying, learning, capturing lessons, and developing doctrine for megacities.
* * *
One can only speculate about where the Army might be engaged next.
But in all likelihood, given global trends in urbanization, the Army can
count on being asked to conduct military operations in a megacity. When
(not if) this happens, it is going to be ugly and costly. When we’ve
faced other difficult domains and environments in the past, the Army
hasn’t been afraid to adapt to meet them. We need to do the same now by
committing one of our thirty-one BCTs to prepare for this mission.__________________________________________________
FYI Maj. John Spencer is a scholar with the Modern War Institute at the United States Military Academy in West Point, NY. A former Ranger Instructor, he has held the ranks of private to sergeant first class and lieutenant to major while serving in ranger, airborne, light, and mechanized infantry units during his 23 years as an infantryman.
