WHY ARE NANCY PELOSI AND THE HER LEFTY COHORTS USING THE CONGRESS TO DELVE INTO THE TAX RETURNS AND PRIVATE LIFE OF DONALD TRUMP ?
Leverage.. the New Justice Department and the IG and the FBI are about to blow up the whole Democrat Leadership of Hussein Obama. All the illegal Kick Back Schemes and Spying and all the Crony Crooked Deals they did are about to be exposed and the need leverage. "Back off or we will expose Trump" kind of leverage!
This is so blatant only an idiot can't see it.
READ ABOUT THE POWER TO SUBPOENA AND CAUSES FOR IT!
HERE IS THE KEY PARAGRAPH WHY THEY CANNOT SEE TRUMP'S TAX RETURNS!
Broad as the power of inquiry is, it is not unlimited. The power of
investigation may properly be employed only “in aid of the legislative
function.”190
Its outermost boundaries are marked, then, by the outermost boundaries
of the power to legislate. In principle, the Court is clear on the
limitations, clear “that neither house of Congress possesses a ‘general
power of making inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen’; that
the power actually possessed is limited to inquiries relating to matters
of which the particular house ‘has jurisdiction’ and in respect of
which it rightfully may take other action; that if the inquiry relates
to ‘a matter wherein relief or redress could be had only by a judicial
proceeding’ it is not within the range of this power, but must be left
to the courts, conformably to the constitutional separation of
governmental powers; and that for the purpose of determining the
essential character of the inquiry recourse must be had to the
resolution or order under which it is made.
Since the election season Democrats have renewed pressure on Trump
to release his returns to them. He has refused, citing an ongoing
audit. He is not required by law to disclose them. Previous candidates
for president and vice president have voluntarily disclosed their
returns. But that is simply a choice, not a requirement.
The Bullshit Legislative function that the Pathetic Democrat House Members have come up with is that they want to pass legislature in the future that " They are trying to write new Law to make sure that Presidents provide Tax Returns" That is Bullshit!
the
committee had no legitimate reason to see Mr. Trump’s returns. Mr.
Consovoy was defending Mr. Trump’s privacy rights as a private taxpayer,
but his arguments closely mirrored those used by Republicans in
Congress who have argued against making the request.
“Even if Ways and Means had a legitimate
committee purpose for requesting the president’s tax returns and return
information, that purpose is not driving Chairman Neal’s request,” the
lawyer wrote. “His request is a transparent effort by one political
party to harass an official from the other party because they dislike
his politics and speech.”
That stand hinted at a significant legal
fight to come. The authority invoked by Mr. Neal, Section 6103 of the
tax code, says only that the agency “shall furnish” the information upon
request. Mr. Neal gave the I.R.S. until next week to comply.
If it does not, the House could go to
court to try to enforce the request — a process that could take months
to sort out, or longer. Democrats believe the Trump administration could
present an argument similar to the one made by Mr. Consovoy on Friday,
namely that Mr. Neal’s request lacks a legitimate legislative purpose
and, based on past court precedent, is essentially invalid.
In making his request, Mr. Neal did not
cite issues like possible tax fraud but instead said he wanted to
examine audit procedures for a president.
“If Chairman Neal genuinely wants to
review how the I.R.S. audits presidents, why is he seeking tax returns
and return information covering the four years before President Trump
took office?” the lawyer asked. “Why is he not requesting information
about the audits of previous presidents?”
Democrats know there's nothing
earth-shaking in Trump's tax returns but they want them anyway. What
exactly do they hope to find?
As
a rich, successful man, no doubt Trump cuts some corners and takes
questionable deductions. So what? No one ever got rich in America paying
every dime of their taxes. Besides, there are so many gray areas and
rules with multiple interpretations in the tax code that any modestly
informed accountant can legally save a client millions of dollars.
For his part, Trump is digging in, telling his enemies he will fight their request all the way to the Supreme Court.
Source of the Power to Investigate
No provision of the Constitution expressly authorizes either house of
Congress to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it
may exercise its legislative functions effectively and advisedly. But
such a power had been frequently exercised by the British Parliament and
by the Assemblies of the American Colonies prior to the adoption of the
Constitution.185
It was asserted by the House of Representatives as early as 1792 when
it appointed a committee to investigate the defeat of General St. Clair
and his army by the Indians in the Northwest and empowered it to “call
for such persons, papers, and records, as may be necessary to assist
their inquiries.”186
The Court has long since accorded its agreement with Congress that
the investigatory power is so essential to the legislative function as
to be implied from the general vesting of legislative power in Congress.
“We are of the opinion,” wrote Justice Van Devanter for a unanimous
Court, “that the power of inquiry—with process to enforce it—is an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. . . . A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence
of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is
intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not
itself possess the requisite information—which not infrequently is
true—recourse must be had to others who possess it. Experience has
taught that mere requests for such information often are unavailing, and
also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or
complete; so some means of compulsion are essential to obtain what is
needed. All this was true before and when the Constitution was framed
and adopted. In that period the power of inquiry—with enforcing
process—was regarded and employed as a necessary and appropriate
attribute of the power to legislate—indeed, was treated as inhering in
it. Thus there is ample warrant for thinking, as we do, that the
constitutional provisions which commit the legislative function to the
two houses are intended to include this attribute to the end that the
function may be effectively exercised.”187
And, in a 1957 opinion generally hostile to the exercise of the
investigatory power in the post-War years, Chief Justice Warren did not
question the basic power. “The power of the Congress to conduct
investigations is inherent in the legislative process. That power is
broad. It encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of
existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It
includes surveys of defects in our social, economic or political system
for the purpose of enabling the Congress to remedy them. It comprehends
probes into departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption,
inefficiency or waste.”188
Justice Harlan summarized the matter in 1959. “The power of inquiry has
been employed by Congress throughout our history, over the whole range
of the national interests concerning which Congress might legislate or
decide upon due investigation not to legislate; it has similarly been
utilized in determining what to appropriate from the national purse, or
whether to appropriate. The scope of the power of inquiry, in short, is
as penetrating and far-reaching as the potential power to enact and
appropriate under the Constitution.”189
Broad as the power of inquiry is, it is not unlimited. The power of
investigation may properly be employed only “in aid of the legislative
function.”190
Its outermost boundaries are marked, then, by the outermost boundaries
of the power to legislate. In principle, the Court is clear on the
limitations, clear “that neither house of Congress possesses a ‘general
power of making inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen’; that
the power actually possessed is limited to inquiries relating to matters
of which the particular house ‘has jurisdiction’ and in respect of
which it rightfully may take other action; that if the inquiry relates
to ‘a matter wherein relief or redress could be had only by a judicial
proceeding’ it is not within the range of this power, but must be left
to the courts, conformably to the constitutional separation of
governmental powers; and that for the purpose of determining the
essential character of the inquiry recourse must be had to the
resolution or order under which it is made.”191
In practice, much of the litigated dispute has been about the reach
of the power to inquire into the activities of private citizens; inquiry
into the administration of laws and departmental corruption, while of
substantial political consequence, has given rise to fewer judicial
precedents.
Investigations of Conduct of Executive Department
For many years the investigating function of Congress was limited to
inquiries into the administration of the Executive Department or of
instrumentalities of the Government. Until the administration of Andrew
Jackson this power was not seriously challenged.192
During the controversy over renewal of the charter of the Bank of the
United States, John Quincy Adams contended that an unlimited inquiry
into the operations of the bank would be beyond the power of the House.193
Four years later the legislative power of investigation was challenged
by the President. A committee appointed by the House of Representatives
“with power to send for persons and papers, and with instructions to
inquire into the condition of the various executive departments, the
ability and integrity with which they have been conducted, . . .”194
called upon the President and the heads of departments for lists of
persons appointed without the consent of the Senate and the amounts paid
to them. Resentful of this attempt “to invade the just rights of the
Executive Departments,” the President refused to comply and the majority
of the committee acquiesced.195
Nevertheless, congressional investigations of Executive Departments
have continued to the present day. Shortly before the Civil War,
contempt proceedings against a witness who refused to testify in an
investigation of John Brown’s raid upon the arsenal at Harper’s Ferry
occasioned a thorough consideration by the Senate of the basis of this
power. After a protracted debate, which cut sharply across sectional and
party lines, the Senate voted overwhelmingly to imprison the
contumacious witness.196 Notwithstanding this firmly established legislative practice, the Supreme Court took a narrow view of the power in Kilbourn v. Thompson.197
It held that the House of Representatives had overstepped its
jurisdiction when it instituted an investigation of losses suffered by
the United States as a creditor of Jay Cooke and Company, whose estate
was being administered in bankruptcy by a federal court.198 But nearly half a century later, in McGrain v. Daugherty,199
it ratified in sweeping terms, the power of Congress to inquire into
the administration of an executive department and to sift charges of
malfeasance in such administration.200
Investigations of Members of Congress
When either House exercises a judicial function, as in judging of
elections or determining whether a member should be expelled, it is
clearly entitled to compel the attendance of witnesses to disclose the
facts upon which its action must be based. Thus, the Court held that
since a House had a right to expel a member for any offense which it
deemed incompatible with his trust and duty as a member, it was entitled
to investigate such conduct and to summon private individuals to give
testimony concerning it.201 The decision in Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham202 sanctioned the exercise of a similar power in investigating a senatorial election.
Investigations in Aid of Legislation
Purpose.—Beginning with the resolution
adopted by the House of Representatives in 1827, which vested its
Committee on Manufactures “with the power to send for persons and papers
with a view to ascertain and report to this House in relation to a
revision of the tariff duties on imported goods,”203
the two Houses have asserted the right to collect information from
private persons as well as from governmental agencies when necessary to
enlighten their judgment on proposed legislation. The first case to
review the assertion saw a narrow view of the power taken and the Court
held that the purpose of the inquiry was to pry improperly into private
affairs without any possibility of legislating on the basis of what
might be learned and further that the inquiry overstepped the bounds of
legislative jurisdiction and invaded the provinces of the judiciary.204
Subsequent cases, however, have given Congress the benefit of a
presumption that its object is legitimate and related to the possible
enactment of legislation. Shortly after Kilbourn, the Court
declared that “it was certainly not necessary that the resolution should
declare in advance what the Senate meditated doing when the
investigation was concluded” in order that the inquiry be under a lawful
exercise of power.205 Similarly, in McGrain v. Daugherty,206 the investigation was presumed to have been undertaken in good faith to aid the Senate in legislating. Then, in Sinclair v. United States,207 on its facts presenting a close parallel to Kilbourn,
the Court affirmed the right of the Senate to carry out investigations
of fraudulent leases of government property after suit for recovery had
been instituted. The president of the lessee corporation had refused to
testify on the ground that the questions related to his private affairs
and to matters cognizable only in the courts wherein they were pending,
asserting that the inquiry was not actually in aid of legislation. The
Senate had prudently directed the investigating committee to ascertain
what, if any, legislation might be advisable. Conceding “that Congress
is without authority to compel disclosures for the purpose of aiding the
prosecution of pending suits,” the Court declared that the authority
“to require pertinent disclosures in aid of its own constitutional power
is not abridged because the information sought to be elicited may also
be of use in such suits.”208
Although Sinclair and McGrain involved inquiries
into the activities and dealings of private persons, these activities
and dealings were in connection with property belonging to the United
States Government, so that it could hardly be said that the inquiries
concerned the merely personal or private affairs of any individual.209
But, where the business, and the conduct of individuals are subject to
congressional regulation, there exists the power of inquiry,210
and in practice the areas of any individual’s life immune from inquiry
are probably fairly limited. “In the decade following World War II,
there appeared a new kind of congressional inquiry unknown in prior
periods of American history. Principally this was the result of the
various investigations into the threat of subversion of the United
States Government, but other subjects of congressional interest also
contributed to the changed scene. This new phase of legislative inquiry
involved a broad-scale intrusion into the lives and affairs of private
citizens.”211
Because Congress clearly has the power to legislate to protect the
nation and its citizens from subversion, espionage, and sedition,212
it also has the power to inquire into the existence of the dangers of
domestic or foreign-based subversive activities in many areas of
American life, including education,213 labor and industry,214 and political activity.215
Because its powers to regulate interstate commerce afford Congress the
power to regulate corruption in labor-management relations,
congressional committees may inquire into the extent of corruption in
labor unions.216
Because of its powers to legislate to protect the civil rights of its
citizens, Congress may investigate organizations which allegedly act to
deny those civil rights.217
It is difficult in fact to conceive of areas into which congressional
inquiry might not be carried, which is not the same, of course, as
saying that the exercise of the power is unlimited.
One limitation on the power of inquiry that the cases have discussed
concerns the contention that congressional investigations often have no
legislative purpose but rather are aimed at achieving results through
“exposure” of disapproved persons and activities: “We have no doubt,”
wrote Chief Justice Warren, “that there is no congressional power to
expose for the sake of exposure.”218
Although some Justices, always in dissent, have attempted to assert
limitations in practice based upon this concept, the majority of
Justices have adhered to the traditional precept that courts will not
inquire into legislators’ motives but will look219 only to the question of power.220
“So long as Congress acts in pursuance of its constitutional power, the
Judiciary lacks authority to intervene on the basis of the motives
which spurred the exercise of that power.”221
Protection of Witnesses; Pertinency and Related Matters.—A
witness appearing before a congressional committee is entitled to
require of the committee a demonstration of its authority to inquire
into his activities and a showing that the questions asked of him are
pertinent to the committee’s area of inquiry. A congressional committee
possesses only those powers delegated to it by its parent body. The
enabling resolution that has given it life also contains the grant and
limitations of the committee’s power.222 In Watkins v. United States,223
Chief Justice Warren cautioned that “[b]roadly drafted and loosely
worded . . . resolutions can leave tremendous latitude to the discretion
of the investigators. The more vague the committee’s charter is, the
greater becomes the possibility that the committee’s specific actions
are not in conformity with the will of the parent house of Congress.”
Speaking directly of the authorizing resolution, which created the House
Un-American Activities Committee,224 the Chief Justice thought it “difficult to imagine a less explicit authorizing resolution.”225 But the far-reaching implications of these remarks were circumscribed by Barenblatt v. United States,226
in which the Court, “[g]ranting the vagueness of the Rule,” noted that
Congress had long since put upon it a persuasive gloss of legislative
history through practice and interpretation, which, read with the
enabling resolution, showed that “the House has clothed the Un-American
Activities Committee with pervasive authority to investigate Communist
activities in this country.”227
“[W]e must conclude that [the Committee’s] authority to conduct the
inquiry presently under consideration is unassailable, and that . . .
the Rule cannot be said to be constitutionally infirm on the score of
vagueness.”228
Because of the usual precision with which authorizing resolutions
have generally been drafted, few controversies have arisen about whether
a committee has projected its inquiry into an area not sanctioned by
the parent body.229 But in United States v. Rumely,230
the Court held that the House of Representatives, in authorizing a
select committee to investigate lobbying activities devoted to the
promotion or defeat of legislation, did not thereby intend to empower
the committee to probe activities of a lobbyist that were unconnected
with his representations directly to Congress but rather designed to
influence public opinion by distribution of literature. Consequently the
committee was without authority to compel the representative of a
private organization to disclose the names of all who had purchased such
literature in quantity.231
Still another example of lack of proper authority is Gojack v. United States,232
in which the Court reversed a contempt citation because there was no
showing that the parent committee had delegated to the subcommittee
before whom the witness had appeared the authority to make the inquiry
and neither had the full committee specified the area of inquiry.
Watkins v. United States,233
remains the leading case on pertinency, although it has not the
influence on congressional investigations that some hoped and some feared
in the wake of its announcement. When questioned by a Subcommittee of
the House Un-American Activities Committee, Watkins refused to supply
the names of past associates, who, to his knowledge, had terminated
their membership in the Communist Party and supported his noncompliance
by, inter alia, contending that the questions were unrelated to
the work of the Committee. Sustaining the witness, the Court emphasized
that inasmuch as a witness by his refusal exposes himself to a criminal
prosecution for contempt, he is entitled to be informed of the relation
of the question to the subject of the investigation with the same
precision as the Due Process Clause requires of statutes defining
crimes.234
For ascertainment of the subject matter of an investigation, the
witness might look, noted the Court, to several sources, including (1)
the authorizing resolution, (2) the resolution by which the full
committee authorized the subcommittee to proceed, (3) the introductory
remarks of the chairman or other members, (4) the nature of the
proceedings, (5) the chairman’s response to the witness when the witness
objects to the line of question on grounds of pertinency.235
Whether a precise delineation of the subject matter of the
investigation in but one of these sources would satisfy the requirements
of due process was left unresolved, since the Court ruled that in this
case all of them were deficient in providing Watkins with the guidance
to which he was entitled. The sources had informed Watkins that the
questions were asked in a course of investigation of something that
ranged from a narrow inquiry into Communist infiltration into the labor
movement to a vague and unlimited inquiry into “subversion and
subversive propaganda.”236
By and large, the subsequent cases demonstrated that Watkins
did not represent a determination by the Justices to restrain broadly
the course of congressional investigations, though several contempt
citations were reversed on narrow holdings. But with regard to
pertinency, the implications of Watkins were held in check and,
without amending its rules or its authorizing resolution, the
Un-American Activities Committee was successful in convincing a majority
of the Court that its subsequent investigations were authorized and
that the questions asked of recalcitrant witnesses were pertinent to the
inquiries.237
Thus, in Barenblatt v. United States,238
the Court concluded that the history of the Un-American Activities
Committee’s activities, viewed in conjunction with the Rule establishing
it, evinced clear investigatory authority to inquire into Communist
infiltration in the field of education, an authority with which the
witness had shown familiarity. Additionally, the opening statement of
the chairman had pinpointed that subject as the nature of the inquiry
that day and the opening witness had testified on the subject and had
named Barenblatt as a member of the Communist Party at the University of
Michigan. Thus, pertinency and the witness’ knowledge of the pertinency
of the questions asked him was shown. Similarly, in Wilkinson v. United States,239
the Court held that, when the witness was apprised at the hearing that
the Committee was empowered to investigate Communist infiltration of the
textile industry in the South, that it was gathering information with a
view to ascertaining the manner of administration and need to amend
various laws directed at subversive activities, that Congress hitherto
had enacted many of its recommendations in this field, and that it was
possessed of information about his Party membership, he was notified
effectively that a question about that affiliation was relevant to a
valid inquiry. A companion case was held to be controlled by Wilkinson,240
and in both cases the majority rejected the contention that the
Committee inquiry was invalid because both Wilkinson and Braden, when
they were called, were engaged in organizing activities against the
Committee.241
Related to the cases discussed in this section are cases requiring
that congressional committees observe strictly their own rules. Thus, in
Yellin v. United States,242
a contempt conviction was reversed because the Committee had failed to
observe its rule providing for a closed session if a majority of the
Committee believed that a witness’ appearance in public session might
unjustly injure his reputation. The Court ruled that the Committee had
ignored the rule when it subpoenaed the witness for a public hearing and
then in failing to consider as a Committee his request for a closed
session.243
The Court has blown hot and cold on the issue of a quorum as a
prerequisite to a valid contempt citation, and no firm statement of a
rule is possible, although it seems probable that no quorum is
ordinarily necessary.244
Protection of Witnesses; Constitutional Guarantees.—
“[T]he Congress, in common with all branches of the Government, must
exercise its powers subject to the limitations placed by the
Constitution on governmental action, more particularly in the context of
this case, the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights.”245
Just as the Constitution places limitations on Congress’s power to
legislate, so it limits the power to investigate. This section addresses
the limitations the Bill of Rights places on the scope and nature of
the congressional power to inquire.
The most extensive amount of litigation in this area has involved the
privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed against governmental
abridgment by the Fifth Amendment. Observance of the privilege by
congressional committees has been so uniform that no court has ever held
that it must be observed, though dicta are plentiful.246
Thus, the cases have explored not the issue of the right to rely on the
privilege but rather the manner and extent of its application.
There is no prescribed form in which one must plead the privilege.
When a witness refused to answer a question about Communist Party
affiliations and based his refusal upon the assertion by a prior witness
of “the first amendment supplemented by the fifth,” the Court held that
he had sufficiently invoked the privilege, at least in the absence of
committee inquiry seeking to force him to adopt a more precise stand.247
If the committee suspected that the witness was being purposely vague,
in order perhaps to avoid the stigma attached to a forthright claim of
the privilege, it should have requested him to state specifically the
ground of his refusal to testify. Another witness, who was threatened
with prosecution for his Communist activities, could claim the privilege
even to some questions the answers to which he might have been able to
explain away as unrelated to criminal conduct; if an answer might tend
to be incriminatory, the witness is not deprived of the privilege merely
because he might have been able to refute inferences of guilt.248
In still another case, the Court held that the committee had not
clearly overruled the claim of privilege and directed an answer.249
The privilege against self-incrimination is not available as a
defense to an organizational officer who refuses to turn over
organization documents and records to an investigating committee.250
In Hutcheson v. United States,251
the Court rejected a challenge to a Senate committee inquiry into union
corruption on the part of a witness who was under indictment in state
court on charges relating to the same matters about which the committee
sought to interrogate him. The witness did not plead his privilege
against self-incrimination but contended that, by questioning him about
matters that would aid the state prosecutor, the committee had denied
him due process. The plurality opinion of the Court rejected his ground
for refusing to answer, noting that, if the committee’s public hearings
rendered the witness’ state trial unfair, then he could properly raise
that issue on review of his state conviction.252
Claims relating to the First Amendment have been frequently asserted
and as frequently denied. It is not that the First Amendment is
inapplicable to congressional investigations, it is that, under the
prevailing Court interpretation, the First Amendment does not bar all
legislative restrictions of the rights guaranteed by it.253
“[T]he protections of the First Amendment, unlike a proper claim of the
privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, do not
afford a witness the right to resist inquiry in all circumstances. Where
First Amendment rights are asserted to bar governmental interrogation,
resolution of the issue always involves a balancing by the courts of the
competing private and public interests at stake in the particular
circumstances shown.”254
Thus, the Court has declined to rule that under the circumstances of
the cases investigating committees are precluded from making inquiries
simply because the subject area was education255
or because the witnesses at the time they were called were engaged in
protected activities such as petitioning Congress to abolish the
inquiring committee.256
However, in an earlier case, the Court intimated that it was taking a
narrow view of the committee’s authority because a determination that
authority existed would raise a serious First Amendment issue.257
And in a state legislative investigating committee case, the majority
of the Court held that an inquiry seeking the membership lists of the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People was so
lacking in a “nexus” between the organization and the Communist Party
that the inquiry infringed the First Amendment.258
Dicta in the Court’s opinions acknowledge that the Fourth Amendment
guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures are applicable to
congressional committees.259
The issue would most often arise in the context of subpoenas, inasmuch
as that procedure is the usual way by which committees obtain
documentary material and inasmuch as Fourth Amendment standards apply to
subpoenas as well as to search warrants.260 But there are no cases in which a holding turns on this issue.261
Other constitutional rights of witnesses have been asserted at
various times, but without success or even substantial minority support.
Sanctions of the Investigatory Power: Contempt
Explicit judicial recognition of the right of either house of
Congress to commit for contempt a witness who ignores its summons or
refuses to answer its inquiries dates from McGrain v. Daugherty.262 But the principle there applied had its roots in an early case, Anderson v. Dunn,263
which stated in broad terms the right of either branch of the
legislature to attach and punish a person other than a member for
contempt of its authority.264 The right to punish a contumacious witness was conceded in Marshall v. Gordon,265
although the Court there held that the implied power to deal with
contempt did not extend to the arrest of a person who published matter
defamatory of the House.
The cases emphasize that the power to punish for contempt rests upon
the right of self-preservation. That is, in the words of Chief Justice
White, “the right to prevent acts which in and of themselves inherently
obstruct or prevent the discharge of legislative duty or the refusal to
do that which there is inherent legislative power to compel in order
that legislative functions may be performed” necessitates the contempt
power.266 Thus, in Jurney v. Mac-Cracken,267
the Court turned aside an argument that the Senate had no power to
punish a witness who, having been commanded to produce papers, destroyed
them after service of the subpoena. The punishment would not be
efficacious in obtaining the papers in this particular case, but the
power to punish for a past contempt is an appropriate means of
vindicating “the established and essential privilege of requiring the
production of evidence.”268
Under the rule laid down by Anderson v. Dunn,269
imprisonment by one of the Houses of Congress could not extend beyond
the adjournment of the body which ordered it. Because of this limitation
and because contempt trials before the bar of the House charging were
time-consuming, in 1857 Congress enacted a statute providing for
criminal process in the federal courts with prescribed penalties for
contempt of Congress.270
The Supreme Court has held that the purpose of this statute is merely
supplementary of the power retained by Congress, and all constitutional
objections to it were overruled. “We grant that Congress could not
divest itself, or either of its Houses, of the essential and inherent
power to punish for contempt, in cases to which the power of either
House properly extended; but because Congress, by the Act of 1857,
sought to aid each of the Houses in the discharge of its constitutional
functions, it does not follow that any delegation of the power in each
to punish for contempt was involved.”271
Because Congress has invoked the aid of the federal judicial system
in protecting itself against contumacious conduct, the consequence, the
Court has asserted numerous times, is that the duty has been conferred
upon the federal courts to accord a person prosecuted for his statutory
offense every safeguard that the law accords in all other federal
criminal cases,272
and the discussion in previous sections of many reversals of contempt
convictions bears witness to the assertion in practice. What
constitutional protections ordinarily necessitated by due process
requirements, such as notice, right to counsel, confrontation, and the
like, prevail in a contempt trial before the bar of one House or the
other is an open question.273
It has long been settled that the courts may not intervene directly
to restrain the carrying out of an investigation or the manner of an
investigation, and that a witness who believes the inquiry to be illegal
or otherwise invalid in order to raise the issue must place himself in
contempt and raise his beliefs as affirmative defenses on his criminal
prosecution. This understanding was sharply reinforced when the Court
held that the speech-or-debate clause utterly foreclosed judicial
interference with the conduct of a congressional investigation, through
review of the propriety of subpoenas or otherwise.274
It is only with regard to the trial of contempts that the courts may
review the carrying out of congressional investigations and may impose
constitutional and other constraints.
